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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REAL ESTA TE EXCHANGE, 
A Corporation, 
vs. 
MARK ALLEN KINGSTON and 
DOROTHY KINGSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
Case 
No. 10639 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT 
COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY, 
HONORABLE PARLEY E. NORSETH, JUDGE 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker, sold real property of 
defendants that was listed with plaintiff for sale and seeks pay. 
ment of the agreed sales commission. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Parley E. Norseth, sitting without a jury, 
dismissed the Complaint of the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 15th, 1964, defendants were the owners of 
certain real property located at Mountain Green, Morgan County, 
Utah, upon which there was a commercial venture known as "The 
Wheel". This operation consisted of motels, store, restaurant, 
camping facilities, service station and trailer park. This property 
was listed for sale with plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit A). At the same time, plaintiff had received 
a listing to sell real estate belonging to George W. Malloy and 
wife, Audrey M. Malloy (T. 39). Plaintiff, through one of its 
sales agents, Mr. R. Gene Allphin, brought the Kingstons and 
Malloys together and as a result plaintiff's Exhibit B was drawn 
up, which was an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
on the form approved by the Utah State Securities Commission. 
This offer was accepted by the sellers (Kingstons) and provided 
for a total sales price for the "The Wheel" for Sixty-six Thousand 
Dollars ($66,000.00) with down payment of buyers' (Malloys) 
equity in their Davis County property which was agreed to be 
Seven Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($7,200.00), and Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) to be paid on delivery of the deed 
or final contract, and further that the offer was subject to buyer 
(Malloys) obtaining satisfactory financing. The Malloys were 
not able to obtain satisfactory financing or any financing at all, 
which Mrs. Kingston was aware of, inasmuch as she accompanied 
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Malloy to four lending institutions for this purpose and Malloy 
was refused credit at each one. (T. 56) 
The offer to purchase represented by Exhibit B was not pur-
,ucd for this reason and on July 24, 1964, another Earnest Money 
H.eceipt and Offer to Purchase was made up by plaintiff (Exhibit 
C) and presented to the defendant, Dorothy Kingston, for ac-
ceptance. This offer was accepted the same day by said defend-
ant and provided for a sales price of Sixty-six Thousand Dollars 
($66,000.00) with the down payment being the equity in buyers' 
(Malloys') real property and home in Davis County, which was 
agreed to be in the amount of Seven Thousand Two Hundred 
Dollars ($7,200.00). Defendants knew that plaintiff had a sales 
listing on the Malloy property as well as on defendants' property 
and that plaintiff was working for and representing both buyer 
and seller. (T. 49, 50). 
Pursuant to the acceptance of this offer to purchase by de-
fendants, plaintiff prepared a Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
(Exhibit I) which was signed by George W. Malloy and Audrey 
M. Malloy as buyers and Mark Allen Kingston and Dorothy 
Kingston as sellers and which was dated August 28, 1964, an 
Escrow Agreement dated August 28, 1964, was then prepared 
which was signed by the sellers and buyers and was not 
signed by the plaintiff broker. At this time a Warranty Deed 
was prepared by plaintiff which conveyed to Kingstons, the 
defendants, all of the interest of the Malloys in their real prop-
erty in Davis County, which deed was recorded in the Davis 
County Recorder's Office on October 16, 1964. (Exhibit 3). A 
Bulk Sales Affidavit was prepared which recited "No creditors 
of The Wheel" and closing statements were prepared and issued 
to Malloys on the sale of their property and to the Kingstons on 
their prop2rty (Exhibits 9 and 10). An Escrow Agreement (Ex-
hibit 2) was prepared together with a Warranty Deed for the 
defendants' property (Exhibit 6) and said Escrow Agreement, 
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together with the Warranty Deed from the dcfendan!s, the Uni-
form Real Estate Contract, Bulk Sales Affidavit and an Inven. 
tory of Equipment were deposited on October 15, 1964, with the 
First Security Bank of Ogden, Utah. 
Malloys, the buyers, entered into possession of the Kingston 
property on July 25, 1964, and remained until October 30, 1964 
(T. 62), when they abandoned it because the property was not 
as represented by Mrs. Kingston (T. 63, 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68), 
during which time they paid, in addition to the $7,200.00 down 
payment, the sum of $270.00 on August 25, 1964 (Exhibit F), 
and on September 25, 1964, the sum of $375.00 (Exhibit G) 
Defendants made demands upon the First Security Bank, the 
escrow agent, for the return of the documents held in escrow and 
the same were returned to the defendants. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the defendants de-
clined to offer testimony and the Court granted defendants' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment as it was designated by the Court and 
in so doing stated that the grounds were that the plaintiff had 
agreed to accept its commission out of monthly payments and the 
monthly payments were not forthcoming. 
Although the Court found against the plaintiff on the sin-
gle ground indicated above, the Court signed Findings of Fact 
and Decree which found against the plaintiff on three separate 
grounds and although it would appear that this appeal should 
only be on the basis of the findings of the court as stated at the 
conclusion of the trial, nevertheless the plaintiff, in this Brief, shall 
controvert the Findings of Fact and Decree as signed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT OBTAIN AN ABLE AND WILL· 
ING BUYER OF THE PREMISES OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
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J t has long been the law in this state, that a real estate broker 
h:is f ulfillcd his part of the listing agreement by having produced 
purch~1~ers who were ready, willing and able to buy the listed 
property on terms acceptable to seller, and is entitled to his com-
mission if he docs so. Curtis vs. Mortensen, 267 P. 2d, 237, 239, 
I Utah 2nd 354., F.M.A. Financial Fund vs. Build, Inc., 404 P. 
2, 670, 17 Utah 21 80, Garff Realty vs. Better Builders, Inc., 234 
P2, 842, 120 Utah 334. 
Such were the terms of the listing contract between the par-
ties hereto, the listing agreement (Exhibit A) providing as follows: 
"I agree upon the considerations hereinabove mentioned to 
pay six per cent ( 6 3) commission covering such transac-
tions whether such sale or exchange be made by you or me 
or any other person acting for me or in my behalf at the 
price and upon the terms stated on the reverse side hereof, 
or at any other price and any other terms acceptable to me; 
• * * * * * 
"No exchange for property to be transferred to me is to be 
made unless the property to be received by me is approved 
in writing. If an exchange is made, I agree to pay commis-
sion to you on the above sale price, and that you may col-
lect commissions on all property involved in the transaction." 
(Italics ours). 
Defendant's counsel, evidently with the intention of confus-
ing the issue, made much out of the fact that the listing was for 
$75,000.00 but that the sale was for $66,000.00. No money was 
realized by defendants and therefore plaintiff had not complied 
with the listing contract. However, the Listing Agreement (Ex-
hibit A) as noted above, provided for sale or exchange if the sale 
ur exchange be made at the price or terms stated or at any other 
price or terms acceptable to the sellers. No one can seriously con-
tend that although the listing contract price was $75,000.00 that 
defendants are not bound to pay a sales commission because the 
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sale was for $66,000.00. The defendants have accepted the offer 
and terms of the buyer and have by so doing stated that the price 
and terms were acceptable to them. Further, it was agreed "If an 
exchange is made, I agree to pay commissions to you on the above 
sale price and tha.t you may collect commission on all properties 
involved in the transaction." (Italics ours). It would seem, there-
fore, that defendants are in no position to complain that the 
plaintiff did not provide them with an "able" buyer inasmuch as 
they did not receive cash from the buyer, because by the very 
terms of the listing contract, they contemplated that there would 
be an exchange of properties and that if there was an exchange 
that they would pay a commission on the sale and on all other 
properties involved in the transaction. 
In order to entitle a broker to a commission under such an 
agreement, our courts have not even required that a binding con-
tract be entered into (Curtis vs. Mortensen Supra.), however, in ' 
the case before the bar, not only one, but two binding contracts 
were entered into between the purchasers and sellers. The first 
being the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase signed 
by the Malloys as purchasers as accepted by Dorothy Kingston 
as seller (Exhibit C) and the second being the Uniform Real Es-
tate Contract signed by Mr. and Mrs. Malloy as buyers and Mr. 
and Mrs. Kingston as sellers (Defendants' Exhibit 1). 
The sellers have received approximately $7,000.00 by way of 
exchange of property from Malloys and $645.00 in cash. Malloys 
testify that the reason he gave the property back to Kingstons 
was because of the misrepresentations of Mrs. Kingston, the seller, 
in regard to income capabilities of the property and debts. Can 
it seriously be contended that the buyers, Malloy, were not "will-
ing and able"? If they were not, this was a fact well known to 
Mrs. Kingston inasmuch as she accompanied Mr. Malloy to four 
lending institutions with the purpose of Mr. Malloy obtaining a 
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$:1 oon ()() loan or any loan to add to the down payment and she 
ii<Js wdl ;mare of the fact that he could not qualify for this pur-
pose with these lending institutions. 
A recent Utah case and the one most nearly in point is F.M.A. 
Financial Corp. vs. Build, Inc., 404 P. 2d 670, 17 Utah 2d 80. An 
npartment house was listed with Cook Realty Co., the seller agree-
ing to pay a 53 commission on the sale price. Through the ef-
f11rts of the realtor, the seller entered into an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Exchange Agreement to sell the apartment house for 
$77,500.00 and received from buyers a duplex valued at $25,000.00 
as a down payment. A Promissory Note was given for the sales 
commission and when not paid, suit was brought on the note. 
The seller, although retaining the $25,000.00 down payment, de-
fended the suit claiming lack of consideration because the buyers, 
within 60 days after the sale became dissatisfied and brought suit 
for rescision which was successfully defended by seller. 
The Court held as follows: 
"It is indeed the obligation of the real estate broker to pro-
duce a buyer willing and able to purchase the property who 
enters into an agreement to do so; and that this be done 
without any dishonesty, fraud or misrepresentation which 
will leave the seller vulnerable to a loss of his bargain. But 
that is the extent of his obligation and when it is done he 
cannot be held to be an insurer against the possibility that 
the buyer may become dissatisfied with his bargain and 
bring a lawsuit claiming the right of rescision." 
What the established rules of law governing a broker's right 
to a commission are, are stated in the California case of Lipton 
vs. Johansen 233 P. 2d 648 as follows: 
"II. A broker's commission is earned when the vendee and 
vendor have executed a binding written agreement between 
them upon the terms provided in the contract of employment 
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of the broker and the vendee is ready, willing and able to 
perform the contract on the terms prescribed. 
"III. The readiness, willingness and ability of the vendee 
are conclusively presumed in a suit by a broker to recover 
his commission upon proof that the vendor has entered intr_, 
a valid contract for purchase and sale with the vendee. 
(Italics ours) 
"IV. The right of the broker to his commission is not af-
fected by failure of either party to carry out the agreement." 
In the case of Diamond vs. Huenergardt 346 P. 2d 37 (Cal.) 
it is set out as follows: 
"It is settled law that where the owner of property accepts 
the offer made by a person produced by the broker employed 
to make the sale, he thereby admits the readiness, willing-
ness and ability of the purchaser to consumate the sale and 
the owner is estopped to deny purchaser's ability or willing-
ness to complete the purchase." 
In the case of Austin vs. Richards 304 P. 2d, 1932 (Cal.) it 
was held as follows: 
"The execution of a contract of sale by the vendor of realty 
was conclusive proof that he was satisfied as to the qualifi-
cations of the purchaser and of purchaser's ability to per-
form the contract and vendor was liable for broker's com-
mission and was estopped by such approval from denying 
such liability." 
Also in point, see Beazell vs. Kane 274 P. 2d 224 (Cal.); Car-
doza vs. Moorehouse 17 Cal. Reports 28; Myer vs. Selggio 181 P. 
2d 690, 692 (Cal.); Malmstedt vs. Stillwell 294 P. 41 P. 41 (Cal.). 
The trial court has apparently taken the position that the 
broker is an "insurer" of good and faithful performance on the 
part of the buyer and that the buyer will never become dissatis-
fied with his bargain and default or attempt to rescind. The case 
of F.M.A. Financial Corp. vs. Builders, Inc. (Supra.), stands firmly 
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fur the proposition that the broker cannot be held to be an in-
sL1rer against such possibilities. 
Under the facts of the case, it is ridiculous for defendants to 
c:untend and error for the Court to find that the plaintiff did not 
obtain a willing and able buyer for the defendants. Plaintiff did 
all he was employed to do and defendants had accepted the terms 
of the offer of the Malloys and had accepted the Malloys as "ready, 
willing and able buyers". 
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS AN UNDISCLOSED AGENT FOR FEE 
FOR BOTH THE BUYERS AND SELLERS IN SAID SUBJECT 
TRANSACTION. 
Inasmuch as the defendants declined to testify, the only evi-
dence on this point would have to come from the plaintiff and 
its witnesses. The only evidence before the Court is as follows: 
Transcript Page 49: 
"BY MR. HANDY: 
Q. Your name is R. Gene Allphin and you have previously 
testified in this matter and taken the oath? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Allphin, will you state whether or not at any time 
you informed Mrs. Kingston that the Real Estate Ex-
change had a listing on the property of the Malloys' as 
well as on The Wheel? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And when was this conversation had? 
A. When I showed her the Malloy property, I told her that 
I had the listing. 
Q. On the Malloy property also? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Now, did you have a conversation where you informed 
Mrs. Kingston that you were working for both parties 
in this matter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where and when? 
A. When I wrote up the final contract." 
Transcript Page SI: 
"TIIE WITNESS: The day that I made the Earnest Money 
Contract between the Malloys and Mrs. Kingston at The 
Wheel. When they sat down at this table and talked this 
arrangement over between theCT, I told them at that time 
I represented both parties and I couldn't take side issue. 
MR. HANDY: 
Q. Was there anything said about that by either party? 
A. No." 
If this testimony had been false, it would have been a sim-
ple thing for the defendant to be sworn and deny such testimony. 
Further, in aiding the Court to arrive at the truth of the matter, 
it would have been the duty of the defendant, if such testimony 
was false, to deny it. Defendants made no claim to the Court of 
prejudice. It is also significant that when the Court pronounced 
its decision and rendered Judgment at the conclusion of the evi-
dence, this point was not mentioned by the Court nor referred to 
in the slightest manner. 
The defendants were well aware that this transaction in-
volved an exchange of properties. They were well aware that the 
Real Estate Exchange had a listing on both of the properties to 
be exchanged and further in the Exclusive Sales Agency Contract 
identified as plaintiff's Exhibit A, it authorized the plaintiff to 
either sell or exchange the prop2rty of seller and agreed "If an 
exchange is made, I agree to pay commission to you on the above 
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snlc pticc and that you may collect commissions on all properties 
uiPolvcd in the transaction." 
POINT 3. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT PAYMENT OF THE 
COMMISSION OUT OF THE MONTHLY PAYMENTS MADE 
IN ACCORDANCE TO THE ESCROW AGREEMENT AND 
THAT THE PURCHASERS MADE NO PAYMENT ON SAID 
CONTRACT EXCEPT AS HEREINBEFORE SET FORTH. 
The Court obviously was in error in finding that no pay-
ments had been made on the contract except the $445.00 men-
tioned in paragraph 7 of the Findings in that even a casual con-
sideration of defendants' Exhibit No. I, which is the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, shows that the sellers acknowledged re-
ceiving $6,880.00 as a down payment from the purchasers and 
just as casual an observation of plaintiff's Exhibits F and G show 
that an additional $645.00 was paid to the sellers by the pur-
chasers. 
It is important to recall the sequence of events in this mat-
ter. On February 15, 1964, defendants signed an Exclusive Sales 
AgPncy Contract with plaintiff which provided for the payment 
of a six per cent (63) commission on sale or exchange of de-
fendants' properties (Exhibit A); on July 7, 1964, an Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was signed by George W. 
Malloy and Audrey M. Malloy as Buyers, and Dorothy Kingston 
as Sellers (Exxhibit B); on July 24, 1964, Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase was signed by George W. Malloy and 
Audrey M. Malloy as Buyers and Dorothy Kingston as Seller 
(Exhibit C); on August 19, 1964, Uniform Real Estate Contract 
which incorporated the terms of the July 24, 1964 offer and 
which was signed by Malloys as Buyers and Mark Allen King-
'1011 and Dorothy Kingston as Sellers; on August 28, 1964, an 
Escrow Agreement, signed by Malloys as Grantees and Kingstons 
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as Grantors (Exhibit 2); on the same date a Warranty Deed 
from the Malloys to the Kingstons for the Malloys' interest in 
the Davis County property was executed (Exhibit 3), together 
with the other necessary documents. 
The above sequence of events is necessary in order to show 
that well before the Escrow Agreement was signed by Buyer and 
Seller, and to which plaintiff was not a party, the plaintiff had 
found a ready, willing and able buyer for the Seller on terms 
aceptable to the seller and was therefore entitled to his commis-
sion (Curtis vs. Mortenson Supra.). Plaintiff had fully performed 
his part of the contract known as the Exclusive Sales Agency Con 
tract and at that time was entitled to his commission for services 
rendered. 
There can be no doubt that on August 19, 1964, when the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract was signed by both buyers and 
sellers incorporating the terms of the July 24th Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase that plaintiff had fully performed 
his obligations under the contract and had earned its commission 
(Curtis vs. Mortenson supra., F.M.A. Financial Corp. vs. Build, 
Inc., supra., Lipton vs. Johansen 233 P. 2d 648 (Cal.), Cardoza 
vs Moorehouse 17 Cal. Reports 28, Diamond vs. Huenergardt 346 
P. 2d 37 (Cal.) Austin vs. Richards 304 P. 2d 132 (Cal.). 
The Court has erroneously concluded that the expression con-
tained in the Escrow Agreement "The escrow agent is authroized 
to expend from each monthly payment received the following: 
"* * also $87.50 payable to Real Estate Exchange at 2421 Kiesel 
Ave., Ogden, Utah, until the real estate commission in the amount 
of $3,900.00 is paid in full", (italics ours) was an agreement on 
the part of plaintiff to accept its commission piecemeal when and 
if certain agreed payments are made by the buyer. Nowhere in 
this agreement, to which plaintiff was not a party, does plaintiff 
substitute its right to a commission already earned for one which 
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rTll(Y never be received. It is folly to so contend and so find. It 
, ,urnot. by the weirdest stretch of the imagination seriously be 
,.011 1cnclcd that the sellers' direction to the escrow agent to dis-
trihute a portion of the monthly payment to plaintiff to apply 
on the fee earned was an agreement on the part of plaintiff to 
forego its commission except and when the monthly payments 
were made. Clearly, the intention of the parties was that even 
though the listing agreement provided for payment of a real es-
tate ('()mmission in the event of an exchange of properties, that 
inasmuch ns sellers-defendants had not received cash for their 
equity that plaintiff should at least have the security of receiving 
a portion of the monies received on the contract until such time 
1s the Malloy property received in exchange as a down payment 
was sold (T. 37). There never was an assignment of the Escrow 
funds or any part to plaintiff. And plaintiff, not being a party 
to the Escrow agreement, never could have urged the enforce-
ment of any of its provisions on his behalf. Can it seriously be 
contended that the plaintiff would forego its right to the com-
mission as agreed, when it had obtained the conveyance to de-
fendants of an equity in Malloys' property valued at from $6,880 
to $7,200 and had the deed recorded? To so find would be to 
find that a new contract had been entered into between the plain-
tiff and the defendants after the plaintiff had fully earned its 
commission and such new contract, if any, is totally without con-
sideration, and therefore would be void and not binding on the 
plaintiff. Conclusive on this point is the following quote from 
P.M.A. Financial Fund Corp. vs. Build, Inc., Supra.: 
"The plaintiff's claim of accord and satisfaction is premised 
on a statement which it avers that Mr. Cook (of Cook Realty) 
made to Mr. Stromness in talking over the difficulties the 
latter was having with the sale: 'Richard, make one more 
payment today and let's forget the whole thing' and that 
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the defendant made such a payment. The general rule, ana 
the rule which this court has followed, is that where a claim 
is for a definite and undisputed amount which is past due. 
an agreement by the creditor (Cook) to take a lesser amount 
which is pa.id, does not discharge the whole debt. This i; 
so because the creditor receives only what he is entitled to 
and there is no consideration for the new agreement. 
"It is true that the modern trend is to be cautious about 
rigidly applying this rule aPd that courts are generally 
somewhat indulgent toward finding consideration some-
where in the new arrangement, such as that it was to settle 
a dispute, or that there is some advantage to the creditor 
in accepting the lesser amount, where the unreasoning ad-
herence to the rule might result in inequity. But we per-
ceive nothing in this case to persuade us that the trial court 
was wrong in failing to so judge this situation. In fact, the 
contrary appears. Accepting the defendant's argument would 
result in giving him the duplex he received as a down pay· 
ment, together with the other benefits of the sale a.nd re-
lieve him of his obligation to pay the agreed commission." 
(Italics ours.) 
See Am. fur. 2d Vol. 12, p. 798 Sec. 35: 
"If a broker's contract is the ordinary one that is terminable 
at the will of the principal at any time if it is still executory, 
a modification of it need not be supported by new consid-
eration. Where however, there is such a mutuality or reci· 
procity of consideration as to deprive the principa.l of the 
absolute right of determining the contract or as to make the 
contract mutually obligatory, there can be no valid modifi· 
cation of it without some consideration moving to the party 
who would be adversely affected nor can there be any en· 
forceable, substantial modification of a broker's executed 
contract unless the agreement relating thereto is founded 
upon sufficient or at least some consideration. 
"In accordance with these principles a consideration is nec-
essary for an agreement between the principal and broker 
to release earned commissions, to postpone their payment, 
to ma.ke such payment contingent upon the happening ol 
cer tain events or to withdraw from the contract after the 
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broker has entered upon a performance of his undertaking." 
(Italics ours.) 
Am. fur. 2d Vol. 12, p. 799, Sec. 36: 
"H'here, however, the contract is executed or some services 
had been performed by the broker, substantial consideration 
is necessary to support his agreement to modify the terms 
of the contract as to compensation." (Italics ours.) 
To the same effect, see 12 Corpus Juris Secundum p. 149, Sec. 
ti4 (Brokers): 
"In order that a broker's right to compensation may rest 
upon a new or modified contract rather than upon the orig-
inal contract of employment, it is essential that both parties 
assent to the change or modification and that a new or modi-
fied contract be based on a sufficient consideration. (Italics 
ours.) 
In the case of John Reis Co., vs Zimmerli 120 N.E. 692 N.Y., 
plaintiff was employed by defendant to sell certain real estate. 
Thereafter he found a ready, willing and able purchaser and e. 
contract was entered int:o between seller and purchaser. The con-
tract contained the following clause: "The seller agrees that Mr. 
Ohnewald of Reis & Company brought about this sale and agrees 
tu pay the broker's commission therefor and who shall be entitled 
to his commission upon title passing." (Italics ours.) 
'The Court of Appeals of New York in reversing the trial 
Court held: 
'At the time the contract was signed, Ohnewald had pro-
cured a purchaser and his right to his commission had ac-
crued (citing cases). It is true that when the written con-
tract was prepared for execution, he expressed his willing-
ness, if it would be more convenient for defendant, to wait 
until title passed. But his contract with defendant had been 
fnllv executed bv him and the defendant could not be re-
lcas.ed from his liability to pay commissions without a con-
sideration (citing cases). There was no evidence of any 
promise on the part of the defendant to do what he was not 
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already obligated to do (citing cases). Ohnewald's agree. 
ment to wait was therefore Nudum Pactum and was unen. 
forceable.' " 
See also Miller vs. Rossiter 209 N.Y.S. 767: 
"The action was for brokerage commission earned in pro-
curing a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on de. 
fendant's terms. A contract of sale was entered into. Imme-
diately thereafter the broker made an agreement to wait for 
payment of his commission 'when as and if title closes'. Ob-
jections were made to the titl::- and by mutual agreement, 
the contract was rescinded; the money paid on account re-
turned to the purchaser and the defendants paid the ex-
penses incurred by the purchaser. 
"The brokerage commission in this case was earned when 
the contract was entered into. The agreement made by the 
broker was without consideration and unenforceable." 
(Italics ours.) 
See also Clarke vs. Dulien Steel Products 128 P. 2d. 608 
(Cal.), Austin vs. Richards 304 P. 2d 133, 134 (Cal.), LeBlond vs 
Wolfe 188 P. 2d 278 (Cal.), Cardoza vs. Moorehouse 17 Cal. 
Reports 28. 
If the Court were to interpret the quoted statement from the 
escrow instructions as being a new contract for the payment of 
the broker's commission, and the plaintiff was a party to such 
contract, the Court would still have to find sufficient considera· 
tion for the new contract, and even defendants do not so contend. 
not having offered any evidence whatsoever and needless to say, 
not on this point. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff fully executed his contract with the defendants 
in that it obtained for the defendants a ready, willing and able 
buyer on terms acceptable to the sellers; that said buyers entered 
into a written, binding contract with the sellers; that through the 
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li•n ts ()f the plaintiff the defendants have been enriched in the 
,, 1111 of $7,645.00; that the sellers-defendants knew that plaintiff 
i• l"csc11tecl both the buyer and the seller and such a possibility 
11 :l'- c,intcmplated as shown by the Listing Agreement, the two 
1:" 111 cst Money Receipts and Offer to Purchase and the Uniform 
f{!'al Estate Contract; that the only evidence before the Court was 
ih;it plaintiff has disclosed to defendants-sellers such fact-that 
nlnintiff's commission was earned prior to the Escrow Agreement 
I 
being c'ntcred into between· the purchasers and the sellers and 
rlwrc has been no modification of the contract for commission be-
tween plaintiff and defendants-sellers. For this reason the Judg-
ment of the Court should be reversed with instructions that 
judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum 
of $1,900.00 together with a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Attorney for Appellant 
